lies behind the extraordinary growth in online advertising, which allows campaigns to target specific groups and even individual voters with highly tailored appeals. Data is also the foundation of the targeted outreach on social media platforms that both support widespread citizen social and symbolic participation in electoral politics and provide campaigns with new ways to subtly influence the electorate. These practices enable campaigns to create "individualized information flows" (Barnard and Kreiss 2013) to members of the electorate that are difficult, if not impossible in many cases, to open up to public scrutiny.
In this chapter, we take an in-depth look at the data practices of contemporary campaigns and the new forms of targeted communications they support, through the lens of the 2012 electoral cycle. We focus on President Obama's reelection bid given that practitioners on both sides of the aisle cite the campaign as the most advanced application of data and analytics to strategic communications in electoral politics to date and as the standard that Republicans are currently striving to meet (Confessore 2013) . We first discuss the history of political data, placing particular emphasis on the rise of the sophisticated forms of voter modeling that underpinned the 2012 electoral success of the Obama campaign. We then show how data and modeling work in online advertising and strategic communications using social media. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for democratic practice, detailing the interplay between the decentering of political communication and the ways that campaigns have adopted new means of finding and appealing to members of the electorate. The data presented in this chapter is drawn primarily from a survey and analysis of journalistic articles, as well as open-ended qualitative interviews with campaign staffers active during the 2012 cycle.
In sum, we argue that the explosion of data on the electorate has provided campaigns with new ways to control their message in a networked media environment, from targeting and tailoring online advertising to using supporters as the implements of campaign communications on platforms such as Facebook and the doorsteps of voters. Data and analysis lie at the center of all aspects of contemporary campaigning-from the voter modeling that probabilistically determines who a candidate's supporters are and who is undecided to the continual tracking of the outcomes of voter contacts and behavior online in order to optimize messages. And yet this is far from complete professionalized control of the message of candidates such as Obama, as social media also provide unprecedented opportunities for political discourse by nonelites (Chadwick 2013) . This chapter explores the contours of contemporary political communication in the context of presidential campaigning, revealing both new capacities for controlling the message and the limits to this control in an age of digital social networks.
The Long History of Big Data
Data has increasingly become central to political campaigns, but it is deeply ahistorical to posit that this change originated with the 2012 cycle, as many popular accounts suggest (Scherer 2012; Sifry 2011). 1 There is a gap in the scholarly literature as well when it comes to historical analysis of contemporary forms of mediated politics. The dominant approach to considering the effects of the Internet, and new media more generally, has failed to account for the fact that the Internet of 2012 does not look like the Internet of 2008 and even less so like the Internet of 2004 (for this argument, see Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl 2012; Karpf 2012) . Meanwhile, a body of literature compares campaigning across electoral cycles to account for technological change but offers few explanatory accounts of why and how practices and technologies change or grow more sophisticated.
Scholars need to take a historical approach to understand the particular arrangement of tools, practices, and techniques campaigns used during the 2012 cycle. Indeed, the accumulation of data by political parties, the specific systems that make this accumulation possible, the practices of analyzing and using data, and the forms of strategic communications that data supports all have a history (Kreiss 2012a ). The two presidential campaigns' specific techniques and tools, and differing capacities, for gathering, storing, maintaining, and analyzing data were the product of the shifting configurations and work of different "party-networks" over the preceding decade. In recent years, scholars have reconceptualized political parties as "decentralized, nonhierarchical, fluid systems with porous boundaries among a wide array of actors" that "include interest groups, social movements, media, political consultants, and advocacy organizations, in addition to the usual suspects of elected officials, party officials, and citizen-activists" (Masket et al. 2009 ).
Following perspectives that conceptualize technologies as social actors (Latour 2006) , we add to the party-network conceptualization technical artifacts such as the party-maintained databases candidates use.
2 Party-networks form a large part of the infrastructure candidates have at their disposal as they organize campaigns for office (Star 1999) , although they must assemble and coordinate particular configurations of component parts effectively in order to maximize their chances for success (Nielsen 2012) . In essence, party-networks are historically specific arrangements of human, organizational, technical, and knowledge resources that campaigns can draw on. Party-networks shape the background capacities campaigns have to act strategically during an electoral cycle, providing much of the technologies and staffers available for electoral runs. The advantages that Obama had over Mitt Romney in terms of campaign capacity cannot be fully explained by the differing strategies of the two campaigns, as some recent work suggests (Alter 2013) , although they certainly played a role. The comparative Democratic advantage in voter data, analytic technologies, and electoral tools was built up over a decade at the level of an extended party-network. In short, the Obama campaign had better voter data, more robust databases, a deeper talent pool of technically skilled staffers, and more field-tested tools in its party network to draw on than the Romney campaign did.
The contemporary history of data utilization for electoral purposes begins in the 1970s, when political campaigns and consultants began to take advantage of technological advances to gather and leverage data for success at the polls (Howard 2006; Sabato 1981; Whitman and Perkins 2003) . Driven by Republican innovations in the 1980s, consultants began using data to target specific categories of voters and households with tailored messages using direct mail. With this early work as a foundation, the Republican Party had a strong advantage in voter data, microtargeting, and data systems through the 2004 cycle. For instance, the party developed an extensive national voter file in the early 2000s, called
Voter Vault, which provided the core of its infrastructure through the middle of the decade. There is no systematic research into Republican database efforts past Voter Vault, although a number of journalistic reports suggest both that much of the party's data infrastructure is handled by third parties (Judd 2012a) and that the Romney campaign in 2012 relied on extensive financial marketing databases (Gillum 2012) and in-house data on the electorate in at least some key primary states (Issenberg 2012b of correlated data, which are then layered onto the voter file to generate those composite scores on a 0-100 scale for every member of the electorate.
If in 2008
Republicans were marginally behind in voter data, analytics, field campaigning, and infrastructure, the 2012 election revealed the party to be a full cycle behind the Democrats in some of these domains (Kreiss 2012b) . campaign, Project Houdini lacked the basic capacity to support thousands of simultaneous updates to its database, and the campaign lacked many tools and work practices for integrating new media and field efforts. As a result, former campaign staffers working for Organizing for America, party operatives, and a network of Democratic-affiliated firms and interest groups spent the next three years attempting to solve these problems for the reelection effort. For example, through developing and field testing new systems during the 2010 midterm elections, the campaign and party operatives fine-tuned organizational structures and technical systems (Issenberg 2012a; Madrigal 2012) . All this meant that when the campaign's programmers came on board during the Republican primaries, they could focus on using technology as a "force multiplier" for ground efforts (Lohr 2012) and to overcome problems of scale (Harris 2012 )-instead of engaging in basic technical development. campaign manager Jim Messina said after taking the job, noting that the analytics department would be five times as large as it was during the 2008 campaign (Scherer 2012) . This approach to measurement extended the 2008 campaign's development of "computational management" practices, which refers to the "delegation of managerial, allocative, messaging, and design decisions to analysis of users' actions made visible in the form of data as they interacted with the campaign's media" (Kreiss 2012a, 144) . In 2012, the Obama campaign hired a "chief scientist" as well as dozens of software designers and developers, engineers, and scientists to work with the massive amount of available data (Judd 2012c ).
All of this reveals both that data practices have a specific history and that the 2012 Obama campaign enjoyed a significant party-network advantage in terms of having data infrastructure and practices that were built up and tested during previous election cycles. Although various streams of voter data lay at the foundation of much of the 2012 Obama campaign and modeling shaped its electoral strategy, these aspects of the campaign were generally invisible until postelection accounts emerged (for a summary of these accounts through the eyes of a campaign staffer, see Ecker 2012) . Voters experienced these aspects of the campaign directly, however, through its strategic communications. In the pages that follow, we look closely at new practices of online advertising and social media targeting, areas of campaign practice premised on extensive use of data. We focus on online advertising and social media here because they are areas of significant and growing investment, likely to become even more central areas of campaigning during future presidential cycles.
Online Advertising
Commercial firms ran their first online advertisements in 1994 (Kaye and Medoff they left comments in order to find and target other users like them. The idea is that similar browsing behaviors may predict similar voting behaviors. During the primaries, for instance, the Romney campaign used online survey data to identify voters in Wisconsin who were politically conservative but not yet convinced to vote for Romney, and then it narrowed this universe down to a specific target (18 years old, Republican leaning, dissatisfied with Obama). It then used these individuals' browsing histories to find others with similar web histories to target (Peters 2012 ).
The biggest change in online political advertising in 2012 was campaigns' increased ability to match the online and offline identities of voters. Campaigns (and the firms that service them) matched their voter records to the IP addresses assigned to the computers of targeted voters (Issenberg 2012b ).
For example, firms and campaigns on both sides of the aisle have actively matched party (and commercial-firm-maintained) voter databases to the online registration data of sites such as Yahoo!.
This allows campaigns to deliver video, display, and search advertising to targeted segments of, and even individual, voters. This practice is not new, but it was much more widespread and sophisticated in 2012 than in earlier cycles. In 2008, for example, the Obama campaign took the first steps toward merging voter file data with the purchased registration data of America Online and Yahoo! (Barnard and Kreiss 2013) . By 2012, however, this practice was far more expansive, with candidates matching voter files with data from an array of commercial advertising firms that track the online behavior of consumers with anywhere from 60% to 80% accuracy (Delany 2012b) .
Campaigns also increased their advertising on social media, online video, and mobile platforms.
The two presidential campaigns spent record amounts on Facebook advertising during the 2012 cycle (Kaye 2012c) . Campaigns used Facebook and other social media to serve geotargeted ads to do things such as help increase event attendance (Shepherd 2012) . Campaigns also sought to design advertisements that their supporters would share on these platforms. Strategists argued that when a person shares campaign information, such as online video advertisements, with friends on a site such as
Facebook, that person's endorsement adds credibility to the campaigns' messages (Naylor 2012; Peters 2012) . Campaigns also expanded video advertising during the 2012 cycle, running videos embedded in rich-media banner advertisements (Johnson 2012) and streamed before and after select content on news sites and video sites such as Hulu and YouTube (Barnard and Kreiss 2013) . The Obama campaign expanded its video-game advertising during the 2012 election cycle, running ads in online games such as Scrabble, Tetris, Madden NFL 13, and Battleship. Trade reporting suggests that gamers who saw political ads were 120% more likely to react positively to the candidate and 50% more likely to consider voting for the candidate than if they encountered the ad somewhere else (Ashburn 2012) . All of these online advertising practices are premised on the voter modeling detailed earlier that allows campaigns to focus on niche voters and to find them, given the fragmentation of audiences across different media platforms. Or, as NPR put it, "campaigns that want to reach young males in Ohio might do better buying space in Madden than during The Ellen DeGeneres Show" (Yenigun 2012) .
Although campaigns are clearly embracing the ability to target and tailor online advertising, there are persistent concerns that these practices might be harmful to the electoral process. For one, voters reject this widespread campaign practice. A national survey by Joseph Turow et al. (2012) revealed that 86% of Americans do not want "political advertising tailored to your interests," which is a far higher percentage of voters than those who reject other forms of tailored advertising for products and services (61%), news articles (56%), and discounts and coupons (46%). The public is not alone in its concern. Scholars fear that microtargeting might cause campaigns to completely ignore or tune out portions of the electorate (Howard 2006 
Social Media
Aside from advertising, the 2012 campaigns used social media extensively as a tool for strategic communications with the general public, journalists, undecided voters, and supporters, as well as Although campaigns use social media for a variety of reasons, two developments in strategic communications during the 2012 cycle are of particular interest in the context of how campaigns seek to control their message. First, both campaigns used Twitter in the hope of amplifying messages from the campaign trail and setting the press agenda. These practices reflect the uniquely public nature of the platform. Second, both campaigns used Twitter and Facebook as platforms to mobilize and leverage the social networks of supporters for strategic communications purposes.
With a growing user base, Twitter emerged as a key medium for campaign communications during the 2012 cycle. To provide a sense of scale, the Obama campaign's tweet announcing his victory in 2008 was retweeted (or shared) 157 times, and on election day, users sent 1.8 million tweets about the presidential election. Now, Twitter gets that many tweets every eight minutes (Fouhy 2012) . In 2012, the Obama campaign's tweeted photograph of the president embracing the first lady after networks announced his reelection became social media's most shared image ever at the time (Guynn and Chmielewski 2012) , receiving more than 800,000 retweets in less than three days.
Twitter emerged as a significant platform for campaign activity, as staffers on both campaigns sought to leverage the medium to amplify communications, to set the press agenda, and to mobilize supporters. The Obama and Romney campaigns used Twitter to amplify messages that were in the press and to circulate communications from the campaign trail. For instance, the confusing syntax of Obama's 2012 campaign speech regarding transportation and infrastructure led to the quote, "If you've got a business-you didn't build that. Somebody else made that happen" (C-SPAN 2012). The Romney campaign repackaged and repurposed the "you didn't build that" phrase into a campaign slogan used in advertisements, on the trail, on placards and signs, and on Twitter. The Romney campaign promoted user-generated mashups of this phrase on sites such as YouTube and Twitter, helping to amplify this message to wider audiences.
Twitter also served as a forum for user-generated political content more generally. For example, in responding to a question about fair pay for women during a presidential debate, Romney discussed measures he took as governor of Massachusetts to ensure that more women were represented in his administration, saying, "I went to a number of women's groups and said, 'Can you help us find folks?'
and they brought us whole binders full of women" (Commission on Presidential Debates 2012). The meme "binders full of women" took off almost immediately in viral fashion through the efforts of a number of Twitter and Facebook users, including one post that generated more than 300,000 likes.
5
In addition to pushing out campaign communications over Twitter and disseminating supporters' user-generated messages, both campaigns used the platform strategically to try and shape conversations in social media and to set the press agenda. For example, both campaigns purchased promoted trends (tweets and hashtags that Twitter makes highly visible to users) at a cost of well over $100,000 per day (Kaye 2012b ). The goal, equivalent to a national advertising buy in a sense, was to put a particular message in front of Twitter users. Promoted trends are also designed to encourage user-generated responses to these messages. This often came with considerable risk, as messages such as #Areyoubetteroff? (Romney) and #Forward2012 (Obama) were repurposed and subverted by the campaign's opponents. Campaigns aim to reach not only a large, mass Twitter audience through a promoted trend but, as importantly, the journalists who write about that topic. During the 2012 campaign, promoting trends and pushing messages out through Twitter more generally were new techniques of setting the press agenda and speaking to the political influentials who are heavy users of the platform (Rainie et al. 2012) . Although it is too soon for systematic research to be published from the 2012 cycle, anecdotally it is clear that a number of stories from the campaign cycle originated in, or were kept alive by, journalistic reporting on Twitter, such as the reaction to Romney's comments about Big Bird during the first presidential debate.
Both campaigns viewed supporters' digital social networks on Twitter and Facebook as channels of strategic communications. In keeping with a decade-long practice of campaigns attempting to leverage the social networks of supporters as conduits for strategic communications (Kreiss 2012a) , both campaigns circulated messages on social platforms in the hope that supporters would be the vehicles for their dissemination to their friends and family, as well as wider social networks. This happened on a number of levels, the simplest being campaigns using Twitter and Facebook in the hope that strategic messages would spread virally through the networks of supporters.
With Facebook, however, strategic communications can be more targeted than Twitter. The (Bond et al. 2012) . Even more, the targeted sharing of content turned into very specific appeals in the final weeks of the campaign. As
Judd (2012b) details, Obama for America asked its supporters who had been signed up for the OfA Facebook application to pick potential voters from among their friends in swing states and urge them to get to the ballot box or register to vote. In the final days before the election and on election day, the application flooded its users with notifications asking them to reach out on the campaign's behalf. Officials told Time's Michael Scherer that a staggering 20 percent of people asked by their friends to register, vote or take another activity went ahead and did it. While the campaign hasn't shared how many people elected to press the case for Obama on Facebook in this way, and this is only remarkable if enough people participated to help close the distance for OfA in voter registrations and turnout where it had those goals, the success rate is high enough to raise eyebrows. Behind the Facebook application driving get out the vote was the same targeted sharing code.
As detailed earlier, all of this is premised on voter data-knowing who a campaign's supporters are, identifying priority targets in their social networks, and being able to track the outcomes of voter contacts to measure effectiveness in terms of electoral strategy. and scripts for supporters' canvass efforts. This platform allowed the campaign to "break down the distinction between online and offline organizing, giving every supporter the same opportunities to get involved that they would find in a field office," according to the deputy campaign manager for Obama for America Stephanie Cutter (Calderon 2012) . Meanwhile, Dashboard was integrated with a mobile application that allowed volunteers to more effectively support the field effort (Lohr 2012) . The Obama for America mobile app allowed voters to find local events, to report potential voter fraud, to find nearby houses to canvass and enter data about the results, and to donate directly to the campaign. In addition, the app was synced with Facebook, Twitter, email, and text messages so that the campaign could integrate data and users could share information on their activities as widely as possible (Tau 2012 ).
Conclusion
The 2012 campaign cycle featured a dynamic tension between the possibilities for control and disruption of campaign messages. On the one hand, campaigns over the past decade-particularly on the Democratic side of the aisle-have invested heavily in the infrastructure for gathering, managing, analyzing, and acting on data so as to better coordinate strategic communications across a variety of platforms, including the television screens, front porches, and social media accounts of voters. The
Obama campaign leveraged these infrastructural investments, using data to model voters, to discover their issues of concern, and to target groups and even individual voters with tailored and social messages. Through increasingly computational managerial practices, which entail leveraging data and analysis to shape messaging and resource flows, campaigns attempt to better know and more efficiently and strategically communicate with the electorate.
At the same time, however, as the discussion of Twitter suggests, this is far from the professionally managed polity that some commentators have suggested. Hashtags become vehicles for supporters, and opponents, to creatively repurpose campaign content. Journalists remain the intermediaries for much political communication, and setting the agenda for voters is as much premised on journalistic buy-in as a campaign's ability to speak directly to the electorate. Finally, the social targeting and volunteer enthusiasm on Facebook and Dashboard is dependent on the ultimate buy-in of the supporters who devote their social identities and hours to the cause. In this sense, while big data, voter modeling, and targeting were at the forefront of the 2012 election, campaigning was still premised on the old-fashioned attempts to generate interest, enthusiasm, and political desire among the electorate.
What is clear is that scholars must be attentive to the actual, data-driven practices of campaigns in the study of contemporary strategic political communication. In order to understand the effects of negative advertising, for instance, scholars need to understand how these messages are crafted and increasingly targeted in very specific ways. At the same time, as the foregoing discussion reveals, much of what scholars take to be the organic or viral processes of social media can often be subtly engineered and managed, at least probabilistically. 4 Pending future research, it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty what failed with Project ORCA, although it appears that it was ultimately a problem of technical capacity, organization, and execution. First, like Project Houdini (discussed later in the chapter), ORCA was not able to handle large-scale database updates. Second, ORCA was poorly integrated with the larger field effort, including the structures the campaign had in place to train and manage volunteers.
Finally, the implementation of ORCA failed to take account of the needs and practices of field staffers and volunteers.
5 See "Binders Full of Women," Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/romneybindersfullofwomen.
